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Guilt is a powerful emotion that is known to influence ethical decision-making. Nevertheless, the 
role of guilt cognitions in influencing restorative behaviour following an unethical action is not 
well understood. Guilt cognitions are interrelated beliefs about an individual’s role in a negative 
event. We experimentally investigate the joint impact of three guilt cognitions – responsibility 
for a decision, justification for a decision, and foreseeability of consequences – on a taxpayer’s 
decision to make a tax amnesty disclosure. Tax amnesties encourage delinquent taxpayers to 
self-correct to avoid severe penalties that would result if their tax evasion were discovered. Our 
findings suggest a three-way interaction effect such that taxpayers are likely to make tax amnesty 
disclosures when they foresee that they will be caught by the tax authority, unless they can 
diffuse responsibility for their evasion and justify their evasion. Implications for tax policy and 















The influence of guilt cognitions on taxpayers’ amnesty disclosures 
Introduction 
 The worldwide cost of taxpayer non-compliance is staggering. For example, the 
estimated ‘tax gap’ due to underreported taxable income is $450 billion in the United States 
(Internal Revenue Service 2011) and $80 billion in Canada (Canadians for Tax Fairness 2014). 
Thus, there is considerable interest and practical importance associated with knowing how to 
encourage taxpayers’ voluntary compliance. 
 Tax compliance research tends to examine factors that can increase tax adherence and 
prevent tax evasion. Tax compliance consists of correctly reporting all items of income and 
deductions as mandated by law, whereas tax evasion is the intentional disregard of tax laws 
(Slemrod 2007). Typically, sanctions and penalties are used to prevent tax evasion, and while 
effective, this deterrence approach is very costly, resulting in significant reliance on voluntary 
reporting. Consequently, tax authorities are interested in cost-effective procedures to improve 
compliance. Tax amnesties, which are synonymous with voluntary disclosure programs, are 
relatively low-cost compliance initiatives in which taxpayers are given the opportunity to self-
correct errors on previously filed tax returns. By self-correcting, taxpayers pay the taxes that 
would have resulted had the amounts been correctly reported, but often avoid the penalties 
and/or sanctions that would have been imposed if the tax authority had discovered the errors. 
 Tax authorities are increasingly turning to tax amnesties as a way to increase tax 
revenues. For example, in 2013, the Canada Revenue Agency processed 15,133 cases under its 
Voluntary Disclosure Program (a tax amnesty initiative), and recovered more than $1.2 billion in 
unreported income at an administrative cost of just $6.6 million (Canada 2013). Since 2000, 
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more than half of the U.S. states have offered tax amnesty programs one or more times (Weinreb 
2009).  In the past fifty years, many developed countries (e.g., Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain) and developing countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Philippines, and 
Turkey) have offered tax amnesties in response to economic problems such as recessions or 
public debt (Baer and Le Borgne 2008).   
Although tax amnesties are effective at ‘flushing out’ tax evaders, much remains to be 
learned about the phenomenon of self-correcting in the tax context. Despite evidence that tax 
amnesties are moderately effective tax revenue collection strategies (Alm et al. 1990; Alm and 
Beck 1993; Christian et al. 2002; Fisher et al. 1989; Luna et al. 2006; Torgler and Schaltegger 
2005), prior literature has not explicitly considered the underlying impetus for an individual’s 
decision to make a tax amnesty disclosure. A better understanding of taxpayers’ motivations in 
amnesty situations has the potential to inform and improve amnesty policy, regardless of legal 
context. 
Guilt is a moral emotion (Tangney et al. 2007) that we expect will have a powerful 
impact on tax amnesty decisions, since guilt is known to influence both ethical decision-making 
(Steenhaut and Van Kenhove, 2006) and reparative behaviour (Ghorbani et al. 2013; Ilies et al. 
2013). Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of guilt in motivating an 
individual’s tax amnesty decision.  
Guilt is an agitation-based emotion of regretting a wrong decision or action (Ferguson 
and Stegge 1998). Guilt occurs in response to a moral transgression (Smith et al. 2002). When 
people feel guilty, they perceive their actions as wrong, assume responsibility for their decisions, 
and desire to find ways to either undo the wrongs or punish themselves (Eisenberg 2000). In a 
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tax setting, this suggests that an individual who evaded taxes, and felt guilty about doing so, may 
be motivated to make a voluntary disclosure of their error as a means of assuming responsibility 
and atoning for the transgression.1 
 We used an experimental approach to investigate how guilt influences a taxpayer’s 
decision to make a tax amnesty disclosure. An experiment is able to manipulate the relevant 
factors of interest while controlling for other factors that are outside of the scope of the study.  
Kubany and Watson (2003) developed a multidimensional model of guilt cognitions. Guilt 
cognitions are interrelated beliefs about an individual’s role in a negative event. We conducted 
an experiment on 239 Canadian taxpayers to examine how three guilt cognitions – responsibility 
for a decision, justification for a decision, and foreseeability of consequences – jointly influence 
tax amnesty decisions.  
 Participants were given a scenario in which a taxpayer, who was given an inheritance, 
transferred the proceeds to a bank account in the Cayman Islands, unbeknownst to the tax 
authority. The taxpayer never reported any of her subsequent investment income on her tax 
return. After manipulating responsibility, justification, and foreseeability, we asked participants 
whether they thought that the taxpayer would make a tax amnesty disclosure. Our results show 
an interactive effect of the three guilt cognitions, such that taxpayers are more likely to make tax 
amnesty disclosures once they foresee that they will be caught, unless they can justify their tax 
evasions and diffuse responsibility for their behaviour by blaming tax advisors.  
                                                            
1 Guilt and shame are the two emotions most relevant to ethical decision-making (Tangney et al., 2007). Shame is a 
dejection-based emotion arising from public exposure (Ferguson and Stegge 1998), and is not relevant to the tax 
amnesty decision, since a taxpayer who makes an amnesty disclosure is known only to a tax authority, and would 
not be publicly exposed. 
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 Our results suggest practical implications for tax authorities, as well as tax and other 
financial professionals. Appealing to taxpayers’ guilt through efforts to increase the 
foreseeability of the possible negative consequences of tax evasion may be a promising strategy 
in encouraging non-compliers to self-correct. Tax and other financial professionals could 
emphasize legal and ethical reporting options to their noncompliant clients, which should result 
in a greater likelihood of them making a tax amnesty disclosure. Also, since our results suggest 
that taxpayers can diffuse personal responsibility for unethical reporting just by hearing an 
unethical inference from a tax advisor, tax advisors should be prudent when discussing tax 
reporting options.   
Several contributions emerge from our study. First, we find causal evidence that appeals 
to guilt are effective in increasing the likelihood that taxpayers will make tax amnesty 
disclosures. We therefore contribute to the tax compliance literature by demonstrating the 
importance of guilt in encouraging tax compliance. Prior guilt research has conceptualized guilt 
rather broadly, without considering the nuances of this construct. Therefore, our second 
contribution is that we provide empirical support for Kubany and Watson’s (2003) 
multidimensional model of guilt by showing that responsibility, justification, and foreseeability 
interact to influence restorative behaviour.  Thirdly, we contribute to the restorative justice 
literature by finding that voluntary disclosures, which are a form of restorative behaviour 
(Wenzel et al. 2008), are directly influenced by appeals to guilt. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we formulate our 
hypothesis. Section three describes our experiment, and section four reports our results. We 
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conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for tax policy makers, tax or other 
financial professionals, and tax ethics researchers. 
Hypothesis Development 
 Tax researchers have generally found a positive association between tax amnesty 
programs and subsequent compliance (Alm et al. 1990; Alm and Beck 1993; Christian et al. 
2002; Fisher et al. 1989; Luna et al. 2006; Torgler and Schaltegger 2005). These economics-
based studies implicitly assume that a taxpayer’s motivation for making a tax amnesty disclosure 
arises as a result of a cost-benefit analysis. However, there is evidence that taxpayers are also 
motivated by non-economic reasons when making compliance decisions (e.g., Alm and Torgler 
2011; Baldry 1986). Tax ethics researchers have concluded that tax ethics requires a multifaceted 
policy approach that includes cognitive and affective aspects of human behaviour (Coricelli et al. 
2010; Maciejovsky et al. 2012). Accordingly, we use three guilt cognitions to explain tax 
amnesty behaviour.   
 Several tax studies consider guilt to be an important motivating factor in influencing tax 
decision-making. Grasmick and Scott (1982) found that of sanctions, social stigma, and guilt 
feelings, the deterrence mechanism with the greatest inhibitory effect on non-compliance was 
guilt feelings. Coricelli et al. (2010) find that there is an emotional cost to tax evasion, such that 
emotional arousal increases when tax evasion is initially detected, and is even stronger if the 
evader’s cheating is made public. Also, Cho et al. (1996) suggest that the ‘psychic costs’ of tax 
evasion may be high enough to prevent any economic gains from tax evasion. However, to the 
best of our knowledge, no studies have examined the direct relationship between guilt cognitions 
and tax amnesty disclosures.  
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 The tax compliance literature lacks a theoretically rigorous model of guilt (Alm 2012). 
We therefore adopt insights from Kubany and Watson’s (2003) multidimensional model since it 
is, to the best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive model of guilt. Kubany and Watson 
(2003) state that theoretical discussions of guilt tend to be brief, that there is no consensus about 
the determinants of guilt, and that there has been little effort to test competing conceptualizations 
of guilt. Accordingly, their model was developed to address these shortcomings. Although their 
model has not yet received empirical support, it appears relevant for this study, since it was 
formulated to account for guilt that occurs in response to common guilt-evoking events.   
 Kubany and Watson (2003) propose that guilt is a function of five factors: distress, 
responsibility for a decision, justification for a decision, foreseeability of the consequences 
arising from a decision, and personal values. In order for guilt to be perceived, there must be 
distress (unpleasant feelings associated with a negative outcome), as well as cognitions that the 
individual played a role in the negative outcome. Thus, guilt would be highest when an 
individual is distressed, takes full responsibility for causing the negative outcome, cannot justify 
the decision, foresaw the negative consequences arising from the decision, and the act violated 
the individual’s personal values. Kubany and Watson (2003) suggest that any social 
circumstance that produces distress and heightens the likelihood that an individual will perceive 
himself or herself as playing a role in a negative event is expected to heighten the probability of 
guilt. When extended to the tax context, it follows that a taxpayer who has committed tax 
evasion will be distressed, and is likely to experience guilt if she takes full responsibility for her 
choice to evade, cannot justify the decision to evade, foresaw that the evasion would be detected, 
and the act violated her personal values. 
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 This study focuses on three guilt cognitions: responsibility for a decision, justification for 
a decision, and foreseeability of the possible consequences2. These three cognitions are likely to 
be relevant for taxpayer decision-making, since a taxpayer assumes a degree of responsibility for 
his or her tax reporting decision, has to be able to justify a tax reporting decision, and 
understands the possible negative consequences of an inaccurate tax reporting decision. There is 
also empirical evidence about the influence of each of responsibility, justification, and 
foreseeability on individual behaviour. For example, Curtis (2006) found a significant and 
positive main effect of personal responsibility on personal reporting intentions in a public 
accounting context. There is also a broad psychology literature showing that personal 
responsibility assumed for one’s behaviour affects behaviour outcomes for a variety of situations 
(Mulilis et al. 2001).  Shalvi et al. (2011) found that the degree of lying depends on the extent to 
which self-justifications are available: the greater the degree of justification, the greater the 
incidence of lying. Crawford et al. (1990) found that higher foreseeability was significantly 
associated with rape victim blaming, while Lagnado and Channon (2008) found a strong 
influence of foreseeability on blameworthy behaviour, such that actions that were foreseeable 
were more likely to be blameworthy.     
 Although researchers have found that each of responsibility, justification, and 
foreseeability influence behaviour, we are unaware of any empirical studies that have 
                                                            
2
 The other two aspects of guilt, in Kubany and Watson’s (2003) model, are distress and personal values. Distress is 
an affective state involving feelings of unhappiness, depression and anxiety (Hardy et al. 2003) that can result in 
emotional exhaustion (Tepper et al. 2007). It is impossible for us to manipulate these emotional feelings in an 
experimental context, and so we controlled for distress in our experiment. The other guilt cognition is personal 
values. “A personal value system is viewed as a relatively permanent perceptual framework which shapes and 
influences the general nature of an individual’s behavior. Values are similar to attitudes but are ingrained, 
permanent, and stable in nature.” (England 1967, p.54). In a tax situation, personal values refer to beliefs about the 
ethics of tax evasion. Since there is variation in personal values (England 1967), it is not possible for us to 




investigated the joint effect of these three factors. Kubany and Watson’s (2003) model of guilt 
predicts that these three guilt cognitions will jointly influence behaviour. Consequently, we 
predict an interaction effect of responsibility, justification, and foreseeability on tax amnesty 
disclosure decisions.  
 Hypothesis: Responsibility, justification, and foreseeability will jointly influence the 
likelihood of making a tax amnesty disclosure.  
 We do not specify the form of an interaction because Kubany and Watson’s (2003) model 
does not predict the form of an interaction.3 
Methodology  
Design  
 We employ a 2 (responsibility for the decision: high, low) × 2 (justification of the 
decision: high, low) x 2 (foreseeability of the consequences: high, low) fully crossed between-
subjects design.    
Participants  
 Participants were Canadian taxpayers recruited from a consumer research firm that has a 
database of 200,000 Canadians. To be representative of a typical taxpayer population, we 
requested our participants be randomly selected using two parameters: gender and age. We 
restricted our sample participants to taxpayers between the ages of 25 to 80, evenly distributed 
across age groups, with a 50/50 gender split. We required a minimum of 50 responses for each of 
                                                            
3 We do not predict main effects because main effects should not be tested if there is a significant interaction effect 
(Maxwell & Delaney (2004, p.331). 
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the 8 conditions. All participants were from the same province. A total of 10,166 invitations were 
sent out, and after we received 254 responses we terminated the data collection. Fifteen of these 
responses contained missing data, leaving us with 239 responses. Demographic data is reported 
in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Experimental Procedures 
 Potential participants received an email invitation from the consumer research firm to 
participate in a questionnaire about income taxes. Individuals willing to participate in the 
experiment clicked on a web link, and were automatically directed to one of the experimental 
conditions. Participants had a unique user ID and password provided by the firm, which ensured 
that they could not respond to the survey more than once. Participants were incented using a 
point system specific to the firm. After random assignment to experimental conditions, 
participants in all conditions read an experimental scenario. 
The scenario described a taxpayer named Mary who received a large inheritance, 
transferred the proceeds to a bank account in the Cayman Islands, but did not report the 
subsequent taxable investment income to the tax authority. We chose an international context to 
enhance realism, given the recent efforts of various governments to publicly address the problem 
of international tax evasion (Canada 2013; Chan et al. 2011). In Canada, as in other countries, 
taxpayers must report their worldwide income from all sources on their annual tax return. 
Consequently, the taxpayer in the scenario was required by law to report her offshore income.   
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In the experiment, participants read background information about the Voluntary 
Disclosure Program offered by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). They learned that under this 
program, a taxpayer could correct a previous error, would still have to pay income tax on the 
previously unreported amount, plus interest, but would neither be penalized nor prosecuted. 
Participants were also informed that if the CRA discovered the error before the taxpayer made a 
tax amnesty disclosure, the consequences would be more severe: in addition to the income taxes 
and interest owed, there would be penalties, and the taxpayer could be jailed if the error was 
intentional. Participants then read the second part of the scenario, which included the three 
manipulations about responsibility for tax reporting, justification for not reporting the taxable 
income, and foreseeability of the possible negative consequences for not reporting the taxable 
income. They also answered follow-up questions, which included manipulation checks and 
demographic questions. The wording for all experimental manipulations is contained in the 
Appendix. 
Dependent Variable 
Our primary dependent measure was whether participants thought that Mary would make 
an amnesty disclosure (yes or no) about the previously unreported taxable investment income 
that she earned in the Cayman Islands. We used a binary dependent variable, consistent with past 
tax amnesty studies (Alm et al. 1990, Christian et al. 2002; Marceau and Mongrain 2000).   
Independent Variables 
There are three independent variables: responsibility for the decision, justification for the 
decision, and foreseeability of consequences. We operationalized responsibility according to 
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whether or not Mary was solely responsible for the tax reporting decision, consistent with Zhang 
et al. (2009). In the high responsibility condition, Mary assumed sole responsibility for her initial 
tax reporting decision, whereas in the low responsibility condition, a tax advisor provided 
insights that diffused the responsibility. We operationalized justification according to whether 
Mary had a viable or a poor reason for not reporting the investment income, following Haines 
and Jost (2000). In the high justification condition, Mary used the cash that would have been 
paid in taxes to purchase cancer medication for her young daughter, whereas in the low 
justification condition, she made renovations to her house. We operationalized foreseeability as 
the degree to which Mary anticipated negative consequences from her decision (Griffin et al., 
1996) based on her expectation of being caught by the CRA. In the high foreseeability condition, 
Mary learned that the CRA was working on an information sharing agreement with the Cayman 
Islands bank so that the CRA would obtain the names of all Canadian investors. In the low 
foreseeability condition, Mary learned that it would be virtually impossible for the CRA to 
obtain information about Canadians who had investments in the Cayman Islands.  
Control Variables 
Kubany and Watson’s (2003) model involves five guilt factors: responsibility, 
justification, foreseeability, distress, and personal values. Responsibility, justification, and 
foreseeability were the independent variables in our model. As mentioned (in footnote 2) it was 
impossible for us to manipulate feelings of distress about tax evasion as well as to manipulate 
individual attitudes concerning the ethicality of tax evasion. Consequently, we controlled for 
both distress and personal values. We measured distress by asking participants to rate their level 
of agreement on a 7-point scale with the statement, Mary would feel distressed by what she did, 
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consistent with Masten et al. (2011). We measured personal values by asking participants to rate 
their level of agreement on a 7-point scale with two statements about the morality of tax evasion, 
It is morally wrong to engage in tax evasion behaviour, and, My close friends believe it is 
unethical to engage in tax evasion behaviour. We used an average score of these items in our 
analysis (Cronbach alpha = 0.76).  These two statements were adopted from Bobek et al. (2013).  
We controlled for demographic variables (age, gender, tax preparer, income and 
education) consistent with Bobek et al. (2013) and Chung and Trivedi (2003). Finally, we asked 
whether or not the participant had ever been audited by the CRA, since a prior audit experience 
may have influenced the responses to the questions.   
Results 
Manipulation Effectiveness  
 We performed manipulation checks for responsibility, justification, and foreseeability of 
consequences. Our manipulation check for responsibility asked participants to rate their 
agreement with the statement, Mary has only herself to blame for not reporting the investment 
income. Our manipulation check for justification asked participants to rate their agreement with 
the statement, Mary has a good reason for not reporting the investment income. Our 
manipulation check for foreseeability of consequences asked participants to rate their agreement 
with the statement, The CRA will find out that Mary had underreported her investment income. 
All statements were measured with 7-point Likert scales, with 1 being ‘strongly agree’ and 7 
being ‘strongly disagree’. Responsibility (F=6.45, p=0.01), justification (F=14.80, p<0.01), and 
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foreseeability (F=23.90, p<0.01) manipulation checks were supported, and all in the expected 
direction.  
Test of the Hypothesis 
We hypothesized a three-way interaction effect of responsibility, justification and 
foreseeability on the likelihood of making a tax amnesty disclosure. To test our hypothesis, we 
used binary logistic regression analysis, since our dependent variable and independent variables 
are dichotomous (Jaccard 2001). We used dummy variables of ‘0’ for the ‘low’ conditions and 
‘1’ for the ‘high’ conditions. We also used dummy variables of ‘0’ if the participant said that 
Mary would not make an amnesty disclosure and ‘1’ if the participant said that Mary would 
make an amnesty disclosure. 
We entered all independent variables and control variables simultaneously. Following 
Field (2009), we first checked for multicollinearity using the tolerance and VIF statistics, and 
found no evidence of multicollinearity in the logistic regression model. The model fit statistics 
indicated an acceptable fit to the data, given the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic (χ2 = 5.66, p=0.69) 
was not significant (Field 2009). We also inspected the standardized residuals and deviance 
statistics (Cook’s distance). No standardized residuals exceeded 3, and no Cook’s distance 
exceeded 1, which also indicated an acceptable model fit (Field 2009). Regression results are 
reported in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Support for our hypothesis would be evidenced by a significant and positive interaction 
term between responsibility, justification, and foreseeability. As per Table 2, this interaction term 
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was positive and significant (p=0.03). Consequently, our hypothesis was supported. 
Responsibility, justification, and foreseeability jointly influence the likelihood of making a tax 
amnesty disclosure.    
The independent variables – responsibility, justification, and foreseeability – were, 
respectively, not significant (p =.28), marginally significant (p=.07), and statistically significant 
(p=.03) in the full model. However, we are unable to interpret these results because there was a 
statistically significant three-way interaction among these variables. According to Maxwell and 
Delaney (2004, p.376), “When a significant three-way interaction is obtained, it is generally 
preferable to consider effects within such individual levels of other factors instead of interpreting 
the main effects themselves.”  Therefore, we only analyzed the predicted interaction.   
Second Stage Analysis  
 To interpret the significant three-way interaction, we followed the approach suggested by 
Jaccard (2001). First, we specified a focal independent variable, which was foreseeability, since 
it was the only statistically significant main effect (p=.03 per Table 2). We then identify a first-
order moderator variable. The significant two-way interaction was between foreseeability and 
justification (p=0.02 per Table 2). Therefore, justification became the first-order moderator 
variable. The remaining independent variable (responsibility) became the second-order 
moderator variable.  Using this classification of focal independent variable, first-order moderator 
variable, and second-order moderator variable, we graphed the interaction. The graph of the 
interaction is presented in Figure 1. We also tabulated results from a statistical analysis in Table 
3, in which we show the probabilities of making an amnesty disclosure, as well as the odds ratios 
of making a tax amnesty disclosure, across experimental conditions. 
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 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Results from the graph indicated that, in general, participants thought that a taxpayer was 
more likely to make a tax amnesty disclosure if the taxpayer foresaw that she would be caught by 
the tax authority. This trend was consistent across all experimental conditions, except for the 
high justification, low responsibility condition, in which the likelihood of making a voluntary 
disclosure actually decreased as the experimental conditions moved from low foreseeability to 
high foreseeability.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
Of the other two guilt variables in Kubany and Watson’s (2003) model, distress was 
statistically significant (p<0.01), whereas personal values was marginally significant (p=0.07). 
To check the robustness of the three-way interaction, we first ran the regression with distress and 
personal values as the only control variables, since Kubany and Watson’s (2003) model has just 
these five constructs. The three-way interaction term was again significant (p=0.03). 
Additionally, we then ran the regression with no control variables and the three-way interaction 
term remained significant (p=0.03). These non-tabulated sensitivity analyses confirmed the 
robustness of our results.  
Discussion of Results 
Participants were most likely to say that Mary would make an amnesty disclosure when 
she foresaw that the tax authority was likely to detect her tax evasion, when she assumed sole 
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responsibility for her tax reporting decision, and when she had a good justification for her 
erroneous tax reporting decision. Per Table 3, the odds ratio in this condition was 1.81, which 
meant that for every 100 individuals who said that Mary would not make an amnesty disclosure, 
181 said that Mary would make an amnesty disclosure. Results also showed that participants 
were least likely to say that Mary would make an amnesty disclosure when she did not foresee 
that the tax authority was likely to detect her tax evasion, when she did not assume full 
responsibility for her tax reporting decision, and when she had a poor justification for her 
erroneous tax reporting decision. The odds ratio in this condition was 0.161, which meant that 
for every 100 individuals who said that Mary would not make an amnesty disclosure, only 16 
said she would make a disclosure. Thus, the highest probability of amnesty disclosures occurred 
when each of the three guilt cognitions were high, and the lowest probability of amnesty 
disclosures occurred when each of the three guilt cognitions were low.   
The trend from the graph was upward sloping in three of the four conditions of 
justification and responsibility (the high justification and low responsibility condition being the 
exception). Thus, as Mary moved from low to high foreseeability, even if she could not justify 
her tax evasion, and irrespective of her perceived responsibilities, participants said that the 
probability of her making an amnesty disclosure increased. Also, as Mary moved from low to 
high foreseeability, even if she could justify her tax evasion and took sole responsibility for her 
tax reporting decisions, participants said that the likelihood of her making an amnesty disclosure 
increased. However, when Mary moved from low to high foreseeability, and she could justify 
her tax evasion but did not accept full responsibility for her erroneous tax reporting, participants 
said that the probability of her making an amnesty disclosure decreased. Specifically, the odds 
ratio in the low foreseeability, high justification and low responsibility condition was 0.522, 
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whereas the odds ratio in the high foreseeability, high justification and low responsibility 
condition was 0.291. Thus, participants were about half as likely to say that Mary would make an 
amnesty disclosure if she thought that her tax evasion would be detected.  
Implications  
Tax ethics researchers have not examined the impact of affective aspects of human 
behaviour, such as guilt, on tax amnesties, despite suggestions that guilt feelings can motivate 
taxpayer decision-making (Alm 2012, Cho et al. 1996, Grasmick and Scott 1982). Our study 
extends prior tax compliance research by predicting and finding a positive relation between guilt 
cognitions and taxpayers’ amnesty disclosure decisions. We find an interactive impact of three 
guilt cognitions – responsibility for a decision, justification for a decision, and foreseeability of 
consequences – on restorative behaviour following a transgression. We also provide partial 
empirical support for Kubany and Watson’s (2003) multidimensional model of guilt, since we 
find that three guilt cognitions act in tandem to influence behaviour. Finally, our research makes 
a contribution to the restorative justice literature.  
Retributive justice tends to focus on punishment; restorative justice involves a bilateral 
process that reaffirms shared values (Wenzel et al. 2008). “Restorative justice involves repairing 
and restoring relationships damaged through unethical behavior, focusing in particular on actions 
taken by offenders to make amends.” (Goodstein and Butterfield 2010, p. 453-454). Specifically, 
restorative justice involves “having offenders (a) accept responsibility and accountability, (b) 
engage in respectful dialogue with those affected by the wrongdoing, (c) feel remorse, and (d) 
offer apologies and/or restitution.” (Goodstein and Butterield 2010, p. 456). In a tax amnesty 
program, the offending taxpayer feels remorse and guilt, accepts responsibility for engaging in 
19 
 
the tax evasion, and makes restitution by paying the taxes on the previously unreported taxable 
income. Thus, tax amnesty programs help to re-establish a taxpayer-tax authority relationship 
that has been damaged through tax evasion. Even though we make no comment on whether or 
not the dialogue with the tax authority is respectful, it appears, nevertheless, that guilt cognitions 
may be effective at encouraging restorative justice.  
Tax evasion is both an ethical issue (Baldry 1986) as well as an emotional one (Mason 
and Calvin 1984) from the viewpoint of both tax evaders and compliant taxpayers. From the 
compliant taxpayers’ perspective, there is a perceived social norm concerning fairness such that 
taxpayers have a strong negative emotional response to tax evaders; they think that they should 
be punished (Lévy-Garboua et al. 2009). For the evader, Coricelli et al. (2010) find that 
emotional arousal increases, from a feeling of guilt when the evasion is detected by the tax 
authority, to a feeling of shame when the tax evasion is made public. There are a variety of 
reasons why people engage in tax evasion: perceptions that tax rates are too high; beliefs that the 
government wastes tax dollars; and participation in the underground economy (Molero and Pujol 
2012).While we expect cheating and amnesty disclosure decisions to have similar motivations, 
we find that not making an amnesty disclosure is related to a strong justification for cheating in 
the first place, which is contrary to what we expected. Instead the participants thought that the 
likelihood of making a tax amnesty disclosure would increase when the taxpayer could justify 
the evasion. This suggests that justification may interact differently than expected when 
combined with responsibility and foreseeability, perhaps because of the emotional nature of 
justification. We leave it to future researchers to examine in more detail the impact of an 
emotional justification on tax evasion. 
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Economics-based research suggests that tax amnesty programs can improve tax revenue 
collection, but that these programs will not influence the majority of tax evaders to come forward 
(Alm et al. 1990; Alm and Beck 1993; Alm 2012; Christian et al. 2002; Fisher et al. 1989; Luna 
et al. 2006; Torgler and Schaltegger 2005). Therefore, it is important for tax amnesty policy 
makers to consider additional ways to motivate delinquent taxpayers to self-correct. Some 
researchers have suggested that appeals to emotions may be more effective at securing 
compliance than simply using sanctions (Coricelli et al. 2010, Mason and Calvin 1984). Our 
results support this line of thought and that tax authorities consider making appeals to guilt. 
Tax authorities could encourage self-correction by promoting a message like, “get to us 
before we get to you”, which was the slogan from Michigan’s 1986 Tax Amnesty Program. Tax 
authorities could consider ways to promote this message through marketing initiatives such as 
advertising campaigns, perhaps using the tax authority’s online tax return submission portal, or 
television.  Previous tax research suggests that public service messages delivered via television 
are effective at influencing taxpayers’ attitudes towards compliance (Roberts 1994). Given that a 
fundamental problem in business is how to motivate people to do what they already know is right 
(Hamilton and Strutton 1994), our findings suggest that an amnesty may be a practical solution 
to this broad problem, especially if appeals to guilt are part of the amnesty. Guilt appeals may 
motivate people to ‘do the right thing’. The combination of guilt appeals and a tax amnesty 
program should have the potential to be an administratively cost effective means of increasing 
tax revenues.    
The results may have implications for professionals who have opportunities to provide 
tax-related advice. In our experiment, the probability of making a tax amnesty disclosure 
decreased when Mary did not take personal responsibility for the initial decision to evade taxes 
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because she learnt about the benefits of evasion from her tax advisor. Although the tax advisor 
never suggested that Mary engage in evasion, the advisor did mention that she would not receive 
any tax forms, and could save a lot of money in taxes. Thus, just by providing informal 
information or inferences, without providing actual advice, a tax advisor may diffuse the 
personal responsibility of the client for tax reporting purposes. A broader implication is that any 
professionals who are engaged in providing counsel and advice should refrain from mentioning 
the existence of unethical options, since the mere mention of a questionable alternative, even if 
not formally construed as advice, may be enough to diffuse the client’s personal responsibility.  
Professional standards could consider expanding guidance on this topic, and accounting firms 
and universities could emphasize the importance of personal responsibility during training.   
There are several limitations to our study. First, the results from this research are 
specifically tested on Canadian taxpayers. Since we randomly assigned participants to 
conditions, we have no reason to believe that the results would not generalize to taxpayers from 
other countries, but we nonetheless suggest caution. Second, due to the sensitive nature of tax 
evasion, it is possible that participants’ responses were biased. While we may observe different 
overall levels of individuals making amnesty disclosures in our experimental conditions, because 
of random assignment, we would expect to observe directionally similar effects outside of 
experimental conditions. In addition, we attempted to mitigate this concern by assuring 
participants of anonymity and by asking them what they thought the hypothetical taxpayer in the 
scenario would do, rather than what the participants themselves would do in similar 
circumstances. Finally, unlike many studies that use students, our participants were taxpayers, 




The purpose of our study is to examine the impact of guilt on tax amnesty disclosure 
decisions. We find that the likelihood of a taxpayer making an amnesty disclosure is greatest 
when the individual assumes personal responsibility for the transgression, can justify the 
transgression, and can foresee the negative consequences arising from the transgression. 
Conversely, the likelihood of a taxpayer making an amnesty disclosure is lowest when the 
individual can diffuse personal responsibility for the transgression, cannot justify the 
transgression, and does not anticipate being caught.  
Tax amnesties are administratively low cost programs that generate only modest amounts 
of tax revenue. Our results indicate that these programs may be improved, and more taxes 
collected, if they are linked to guilt appeals. Guilt is a powerful emotion that may encourage 
delinquent taxpayers to self-correct. An emotional appeal for taxpayers to amend their previously 
erroneous tax returns and pay the taxes that should have been remitted may increase tax revenue.   
We encourage further research on guilt cognitions and their influence on restorative 
behaviour in other tax and non-tax contexts. Future research could extend this study in other 
national tax contexts or could consider other aspects of tax amnesties. For example, does varying 
the incentives to make amnesty disclosures affect the incidence of voluntary disclosures? 
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 less than $25,000 
 between $25,000 and $50,000 
 between $50,001 and $75,000 
 between $75,001 and $100,000 
 greater than $100,000 
 prefer not to answer 
 
Highest level of education 
completed: 
 high school 
 community college 
 undergraduate degree 




n = 239 
 
 
n = 120 (50.2%) 
n = 119 (49.85%) 
 
mean = 46.6 years 
std dev = 13.2 years 
 
mean = 22.5 years 
















n = 59 (24.7%) 
n = 74 (31.0%) 
n = 50 (20.9%) 
n = 50 (20.9%) 







Table 2 – The Impact of Responsibility, Justification, and Foreseeability on Tax Amnesty 
Likelihood 
Logistic Regression Results 
Variable B (SE) Wald  Sig. 95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 




Responsibility x Justification 
Justification x Foreseeability 
Responsibility x Foreseeability 























































































































# Control variables with multiple categories are summarized due to space constraints.  
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Table 3: Statistical Analysis 
 
Panel A: Probability of making a voluntary disclosure (by number of participants) 
 
 Low Foreseeability High Foreseeability 
High Justification, High 
Responsibility 
15/32 (46.9%) 22/31 (71.0%) 
High Justification, Low 
Responsibility 
17/31 (54.8%) 14/28 (50.0%) 
Low Justification, High 
Responsibility 
16/30 (53.3%) 19/29 (65.5%) 
Low Justification, Low 
Responsibility 
10/29 (34.5%) 20/29 (69.0%) 
 
Panel B: Odds ratios of making a voluntary disclosure
4
 
 Low Foreseeability High Foreseeability 
High Justification, High 
Responsibility 
0.280 1.81 
High Justification, Low 
Responsibility 
0.522 0.291 
Low Justification, High 
Responsibility 
0.324 0.976 


















                                                            
4 Calculations of odds ratios are as follows.  For the high foreseeability conditions: high/high = exp(-
1.829+0.704+1.180+1.524-1.328-2.110-0.423+2.876); high/low = exp(-1.829+1.180+1.524-2.110); low/high = 
exp(-1.829+1.524+0.704-0.423); low/low = (-1.829+1.524).  For the low foreseeability conditions: high/high = 




Figure 1 – Three-way interaction of responsibility, justification, and foreseeability on 



























Scenario screen with manipulations 
Mary is a taxpayer who lives in Ontario. Three years ago, she received a large inheritance, and 
transferred the proceeds to a bank account in the Cayman Islands, but transferred them back to 
Canada this year. The CRA does not know about this bank account and these investments. The 
investments generated $83,400 annually. Her total annual income for each of the last three years 
was $97,500. 
Responsibility manipulation 
High: Mary researched this investment opportunity, discovered that she would not receive any 
tax reporting forms from the Cayman Islands, and realized she could save a lot of money in 
taxes. 
Low: Mary researched this investment opportunity, learned from her tax advisor that she would 
not receive any tax reporting forms from the Cayman Islands, and was told by her tax advisor 
that she could save a lot of money in taxes.   
Justification manipulation 
High: Mary has never reported any of this investment income on her Canadian tax return because 
she used the cash she would have paid in taxes on this investment income to pay for 
experimental drugs for her 4-year-old daughter, who was diagnosed with a rare and aggressive 
form of cancer. 
Low: Mary has never reported any of this investment income on her Canadian tax return because 
she used the cash she would have paid in taxes for home renovations. 
Foreseeability manipulation 
High: Last week Mary saw a news broadcast about the importance of paying taxes. The 
broadcast also reported that the CRA is working on an information sharing agreement with her 
bank in the Cayman Islands so that the CRA could obtain the names of Canadian investors.  
Low: Last week Mary saw a news broadcast about the importance of paying taxes. The broadcast 
also reported that it would be virtually impossible for the CRA to obtain information about 
Canadians who had investments in the Cayman Islands.   
 
 
 
